The Revenue Code and a Charity\u27s Politics by unknown
THE REVENUE CODE AND A CHARITY'S POLITICS
The recent withdrawal of tax exempt status from the Fellowship of Recon-
ciliation (FOR),1 a pacifist organization, has focused attention on the proper
interpretation to be given those sections of the Internal Revenue Code which
govern the extent of political activities permissible to tax-exempt charitable
organizations.m 2 To qualify for exemption under the Code, charitable organi-
zations are required to be organizations
... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, -scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . no sub-
stantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and which does not par-
ticipate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office.3
Not only are such organizations exempt from federal taxation; the individual
donor, within certain limits, can deduct contributions to them from his per-
sonal income.4 The task of testing whether a group is beyond the pale of
permissible political activity falls in the first instance to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS).5 It has read the statute so as to give itself maximum dis-
cretion to deny exempt status. Concentrating on the statute's language of
exclusivity of purpose, the IRS has enunciated a policy of disqualifying any
1. Letter from Director, Tax Rulings Division, Internal Revenue Service, to the
Fellowship of Reconciliation, Nyack, New York, January 10, 1963, P-H FED. TAXES CuR.
DEc. f1 54, 825 (hereinafter referred to as Letter Ruling).
2. New York Times, May 25, 1963, p. 24, col. 1. See generally Clark, The Limitation
on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REv. 439
(1960) ; Note, Income Tax Disadvantages of Political Activities, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 273
(1957) ; Note, The Effect of Legislative Activity on the Tax Status of Religious, Chari-
table and Scientific Organizations, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 414 (1957); and Note, Charities,
League of Women Voters, 39 TEx.As L. Rv. 525 (1961).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3) (hereinafter, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended).
4. Section 170(c) (2) (deductible from personal income); see also §§ 2055(a) (2)
(deductible from value of gross estate), 2106(a) (2) (A) (ii) (deductible from value of
gross estate of decedent nonresident) and 2522(a) (2) (deductible from the value of all
gifts). The amount of the deduction from personal income is limited by § 170(b).
In the general body of the text, the privileges of deductibility and exemption from
taxation will be referred to collectively as the privilege of being "preferred" or "exempt."
5. Rev. Proc. 62-30, 1962-2 Cum. BU=L. 512, describes the present procedure by
which organizations apply to the Internal Revenue Service for classification as exempt.
Organizations approved by the Service are included in the Cumulative List, U.S. TXEAs-
URY DEPARTmENT, ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 170(c) OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE oF 1954 (1962), and contributions to them are automatically allowable.
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organization which has "purposes" which can be classified as political. 6 In
pursuit of this policy, the Service seems to have ignored completely that part
of the section which requires that an organization to qualify cannot be en-
gaged, to a substantial degree, in "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise at-
tempting, to influence legislation."'7 This provision suggests an approach
less discretionary than the IRS's, oriented to specific activities and subject
to quantification.
The difficulties of the IRS's position are reflected in its recent ruling in
FOR. The Fellowship of Reconciliation was founded in 1915 "as a movement
of Christian protest against war, and of faith in a better way than violence
for the solution of all conflicts." It publishes a periodical, conducts meetings,
and produces books, pamphlets, films and tapes, to further its pacifist beliefs.
FOR has also opposed conscription legislation, the evacuation of the Japanese-
Americans during World War II, and presently is involved in opposing the
creation and testing of mass-destruction weapons. 9 In 1926, the Fellowship
was classified as a charitable organization for purposes of federal taxation;
it retained this status until January, 1963, when its exemption was withdrawn
by the IRS.10 Alternative findings, each of which would have supported with-
drawal, were made by the IRS. The first was that FOR's goals - the achieve-
ment of peace and international reconciliation through love - are political
6. See, e.g., A. M. Blaine Estate, 22 T.C. 1195 (i954) (Foundation for World Gov-
ernment) ; Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 85; Rev. Rul. 60-193, 1960-1 Cum. BULL.
195; J. Forstall, 29 B.T.A. 428 (1933) (League of Nations Assn., Inc.); and J. H.
Watson, Jr., 27 B.T.A. 462-(1932). -
7. There seem to be no reported cases or rulings which have employed the test
derived from the 1934 amendment to deny exempt status by inding that an organization
is engaged in a substantial amount of propaganda to influence legislation. Sugarman,
The Line Between Education and Propaganda, 3RD N.Y.U. CoNF. ON CHAmrTABLE FouN-
DATIONS 173, 177 (1957). This probably reflects the fact that at the very least, the IRS's
"purpose" test excludes all ofganizations which do engage to a substantial extent in
attempts to influence legislation.
8. FELLOwsHIP OF IRECONcILIATIoN, THAT MEN MAY" LVE-STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
(hereinafter referred to as Pamphlet).
9. Letter Ruling.
10. The Fellowship of Reconciliation was held first to be an exempt organization
under § 231(6) of the Rdvenue Act of 1924 of January 11, 1926. This ruling was affirmed
on June 29, 1938 and October 9, 1941. A reconsideration of this privileged status beghn
in 1959. In January, 1960, FOR submitted a memorandum in opposition to a proposed
revocation of its classification under § 501(c) (3). On February 17, 1961, a letter was
written to FOR from the Chief, Exempt Organizations Branch, IRS, notifying them
of the grounds for a proposed revocation. Meetings were held and an additional brief
was submitted by FOR in September, 1961. Revocation occurred by a letter of January
10, 1963, withdrawing exemption" under § 501(c) (3) effective the beginning of FOR's
fiscal year of May 1, 1962, and denying deductibility of contributions made after the
date of the letter. The Fellowship is still soliciting contributions, making the following
statement: "Gifts to the Fellowship of Reconciliation have been declared tax-exempt
for 37 years and an IRS reversal is now being contested." Pamphlet; Letter Ruling;
Hassler (Executive Secretary of FOR), Memo: A Brief History of the Revocation of
the FOR's Federal Income Tax Exemption (March 15, 1963).
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in character and, consequently, that FOR is not "organized and operated"
exclusively for a charitable purpose. As is usual where the IRS applies its
test of "political purpose," no content was given to the meaning of "political."".
And the readiness with which FOR's purposes might still have been found
"religious" in nature suggests both the conclusory character of the IRS test
and the IRS's continuing use of its discretion to restrict the class of organi-
zations granted privileged status.12 The IRS's second finding marked the
beginning of what can only be deemed a logical exercise. "Attainment of
international peace," FOR's expressed goal, was characterized by the IRS
as obtainable only through legislation. This characterization, itself question-
able,' 3 implied to the IRS that FOR was to be classified as a non-charitable
11. See cases cited note 6 supra.
12. Some courts have held that organizations with "political" purposes may still be
characterized as "religious" for purposes of tax exemption. Girard Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941); Lord's Day Alliance of Pennsylvania v. United
States, 65 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
The Service also questioned the religious character of FOR by stating in its Letter
Ruling:
Your statement of purpose ... is worded so as not to exclude from membership
those who deny the existence of any deity. This fact alone might well preclude
your description as religious.
This position is dubious. The case law supporting it is conflicting. Accord Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), and Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946). Contra, United States v. Seeger, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 1115
(2d Cir. Jan. 20, 1964) ; United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943) ; United
States ex rel. Philips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d, Cir. 1943) ; Fellowship of Humanity
v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957); and Washington
Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The lack of a
requirement of theistic beliefs did not stop a New York state court, in a real estate tax
case, from finding that the Fellowship's activities, "although in the minds of many con-
troversial and unorthodox are nevertheless of a religious nature. . . ." Ashbrook v. Town
of Clarkstown, Supreme Court, Rockland, County, New York, September 26, 1962.
It can be argued that a serious constitutional question is created when the IRS favors
certain religious beliefs (i.e. theistic) over others (i.e. non-theistic). *Everson v. Board
of Education4 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179
U.S. 89, 92 (1900) ; United States v. Seeger, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 1115 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 1964) ;
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 693, 315, P.2d 394,
406 (1957). See also Note, State Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clautse, 9 STAIx.
L. REv. 366 (1958).
With such considerations, and given certain standards as to the meaning of religion,
13 ENcYc. Soc. Sc. 237, it would be very reasonable to have concluded that FOR was,
a religious organization.
13. The IRS's conclusion that FOR's goals could only be achieved by legislation
came under sharp criticism by Senators Keating, McGovern and Nelson. 109 CoNa. REc.
7798 and 7842 (daily ed. May 13, 1963) and 109 CONG. REc. 8305 (daily ed. May 16, 1963).
Senator Nelson successfully ridiculed the conclusion by revealing to the Senate a letter
he had written to Commissioner Caplin, asking in part the following:
Exactly how did the Internal Revenue Service determine that world peace could
be secured only through legislation, and could you give me an example of the
legislation needed to bring this about?
109 CoNr. REc. 7798 (daily ed. May 13, 1963). Senator Nelson received no answer.
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"action" organization, defined by Treasury regulations as an organization
whose "'main or primary objective . . . may be attained only by legislation"
and which "advocates or campaigns for, the attainment of such main or pri-
mary objective."'14 The IRS did not indicate that FOR was presently en-
gaged in any activity connected with the passage of legislation; there was
naught but logical "proof" that it was ever likely to do so.' 5 As used in FOR,
the "action" organization test could only have served as an elaboration on the
"organized and operated exclusively" requirement. 6 Thus, the Service's
emphasis on a broad "purpose" approach is dramatically shown.
It cannot be said with certainty that the IRS's emphasis is wrong - that
it involves a departure from what a reasonable man might consider the sta-
tutory command. What can be said is that it arrogates to the IRS virtually
unrestricted authority to decide who may and may not receive exempt status.
The characterization of "purpose" is an elusive matter. There are different
orders of purpose: the ultimate end sought is, at one level, a group's "pur-
pose"; at another level, "purpose" includes the means necessary to that end.
Leaving "political purpose" undefined, the Treasury has felt free to select
indiscriminately among the possible orders of "purpose" in characterizing
group purposes. But does the "purpose" of the American Cancer Society
become less "educational" or "scientific" when it seeks through the political
arena to obtain the education of young people to the dangers of lung cancer?
Whether attention is directed to the purpose of preventing cancer, or to
the purpose of achieving legislation to aid in the prevention of cancer, deter-
mines the answer given. Were the Society's purposes to be deemed not "ex-
clusively" charitable, there would be few groups whose purposes would fall
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3) -1(c) (3) (iv) (1959). Other definitions not specifially
relevant to the FOR case:
a) An organization is an "action" organization if a substantial part of its activities
is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda, or otherwise. Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (3) (ii) (1959).
b) An organization is an "action" organization if it participates or intervenes,
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any
candidate for public office. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (3) (iii) (1959).
See generally, 4th N.Y.U. CONF. ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATioNS 197-238 (1959).
15. See Brief for The Fellowship of Reconciliation submitted to the Internal Revenue
Service, Exempt Organizations Branch, September, 1961. Here, FOR maintains that
it "has not distributed leaflets to legislators nor has it directed persons how best to prepare
proposals for changes in the law." In the Fellowship's Supplemental Brief to the Internal
Revenue Service, Tax Rulings Division, June, 1963, it is stated that its activities "did
not include working directly with members of Congress, or the maintenance of a lobbyist
in Washington." Neither statement was denied in the Letter Ruling.
16. It might be argued that this particular "action" organization test is related to
the requirement that an organization cannot engage in a substantial amount of "propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation," and that the Regulation creates a pre-
sumption that an organization does engage in an impermissible amount of such activity.
If this were the case, such a presumption should then be rebuttable by an organization's
documentation of its activities, and not conclusive as it was in FOR.
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wholly within the preferred class, or whose purposes could not be benefited
by legislative action. Given the Treasury approach, continuance or withdrawal
of exempt status is a matter of conclusory characterization: the organization's
ultimate goal will be emphasized where exemption will continue; the means
it adopts or must adopt for achievement, if withdrawal is the intended result.
This discretion has its dangers. There is, of course, the undesirable though
inevitable hazard of uncertainty. From the point of view of the organization,
uncertainty will often inhibit the sponsorship of activities and programs
which might arguably be classed as "political. '17 The more dangerous aspect
of the discretionary approach is the opportunity for discrimination among
organizations on the merits of the goals they seek. Once an organization has
qualified for exemption, administrative and revenue limitations combine to
render IRS scrutiny of its behavior sporadic at best. 18 The choice of organi-
zations for review, however, may well not be random. A group like FOR
may be singled out for review by an individual revenue agent - ordinarily
responsible for initiating the review process - reading the newspaper and
shaking his head at the group's beliefs. Or a Congressman, strategically placed,
may bring his considerable pressure to bear upon the IRS to the disadvantage
of an unpopular group. The conclusory nature of the test applied, the great
disparity between the number of exempt organizations and the number of
exempt organizations reviewable, and the fact that only the IRS has standing
to initiate review and withdrawal of exempt status, heighten the dangers of
discriminatory selectivity. 19 When a broad "purpose" test is employed, it
17. It may be possible in some instances for an organization to obtain a "ruling"
from the IRS as to the consequences of a particular activity under Rev. Proc. 62-28,
1962-2 Cum. BULL. 496. But, at best, such a procedure is burdensome and time consuming
and does not provide the organization with the flexibility to make quick decisions.
18. Mr. Wormser: Actually, though, you are not adequately staffed and probably
could not be to do a complete job of auditing the substance of the performance of
those foundations. You rely chiefly on miscellaneous outside information and have
to, I suppose.
Mr. Sugarman: ... Our experience has indicated that by and large there are com-
paratively few of the exempt organizations that really stray from the nature of their
original exemption. I am not saying that by way of indicating that doesn't mean
we don't have to check them, but I am saying in terms of the revenue consequences
of our results in this area are comparatively less productive than others. Accord-
ingly, considering the balance of our total activities, and the budget available to
us, we do devote as much as we are able to in this area.
Hearings Before the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and
Comparable Organizations, House of Representatives, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 437 (1954).
See note 57 infra for a discussion of the use of the annual reporting requirement to facili-
tate review of exempt organizations.
19. Once the Service has classified an organization as exempt under § 501(c) (3), it
is said to be "prima facie" evidence of the deductibility of contributions and binding upon
the Service until an adverse "ruling." Obviously, no one making a contribution to the
exempt organization would wish to challenge this status. And how would a contributor
challenge the "ruling" except by refusing to deduct the contribution-an unnoticed act of
defiance which would be to his financial detriment. The ordinary taxpayer who might
19641
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becomes impossible for the critic and the court to discover whether discrimi-
nation was at work, whether the umbrella of the "purpose" test covered some
agent's personal dislike of the organization's purposes or beliefs.
The history of the relevant Code sections is checkered with events which
can fairly be characterized as attempts to limit the sweep of the IRS approach.
That approach was developed immediately following creation of the charitable
deduction in 1917.20 The income tax statutes did not then restrict explicitly
the political activities of a charitable organization, but did refer to the ne-
cessity for an exclusively religious or charitable purpose. The early Treasury
rulings - forerunners of the present IRS approach - imputed to Congress
a restriction on political activities by maintaining that such activities were
not consistent with organization and operation exclusvely for the exempt
purposes.2 ' Organizations engaging in such activities were, therefore, to be
denied preferred status. When this Treasury approach came before the
courts, it received only qualified approval. In the 1930 case of Slee v. Coni-
nissioner,2 questioning the deductibility of a contribution to the American
Birth Control League, Judge Learned Hand acknowledged the necessity of
limiting the availability of tax exempt status to politically adventurous or-
disapprove of the Treasury's selection would have no standing to object in court because
of an alleged improper narrowing of the tax base and the subsequent alleged harm to him.
Massachusetts v. Mellon 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
On the other hand, when the IRS denies exempt status to an organization, any con-
tributor to that organization has a means to challenge the "ruling." The contributor
would only have to deduct his contribution in his income tax return, have it disallowed
by the Treasury, and then challenge the Treasury's position in the courts. Even the
organization might seek judicial intervention. through an injunction against the Treasury,
though this has never yet been tried.
20. Exemption from taxation was included as a part of the Income Tax of 1913. 38
Stat. 166, 172 (1913). At that time an amendment was proposed to allow for the un-
limited deduction of charitable contributions but was defeated without debate. 50 CONG. REc.
1259 (1913). In 1917, an amendment to allow a deduction of up to 15 per cent of taxable
income for charitable contributions was passed. 40 Stat. 330 (1917). There was no
discussion about restricting the political activities of charitable organizations when Con-
gress approved this amendment. 55 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917).
21. .. . it was Congress's intention, when providing for the deduction of contributions
to educational corporations, not to benefit and assist the aims of one class against
another, not to encourage the dissemination of ideas in support of one doctrine as
opposed to another, to the profit of one class and to the detriment perhaps of
another, but to foster education in its true and broadest sense, thereby advancing
the interest of all, over the objection of none.
S. 1362, 2 Cum. BULL. 152, 154 (1920).
An association engaged in disseminating propaganda to encourage the passage of labor
legislation S. 1362, 2 Cum. BULL. 152 (1920), and an organization whose purpose was
furthering the enactment of prohibition laws and the nomination and election of candidates
for office favorable to its work, O.D. 704, 3 Cumr. BULL. 240 (1920), were held not entitled
to exempt privileges. See also Herbert Fales, 9 B.T.A. 828 (1927) (contributions not de-
ductible to the Mass. Anti-Saloon League, Scientific Temperance Federation).
22. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
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ganizations.23 He affirmed the denial of the deduction at issue. But, unlike
the Service, he also recognized that tax exempt organizations might need, at
times, to engage in activity others might call political, and that some reasonable
rule would be required to permit this activity without damage to the tax
privilege:
Nevertheless, there are many charitable, literary and scientific ventures
that as an incident to their success require changes in the law. A charity
may need a special charter allowing it to receive larger gifts than the
general law allows.... A society to prevent cruelty to children, or ani-
mals, needs the positive support of law to accomplish its ends . .. We
should not think that a society of booklovers or scientists was less "liter-
ary" or "scientific" if it took part in agitation to relax taboos upon works
of dubious propriety or to put scientific instruments upon the free lists.
All such purposes are mediate to the primary purpose and would not,
we should think, unclass the promoters. The agitation is ancillary to
the end in chief, which remains the exclusive purpose of the association.24
The dictum, widely accepted in later cases,2 5 sharply questions the Treasury's
assumption that political activities are inconsistent with an exclusively charit-
able purpose.
In 1934, Congress added to the definition of a qualifying charitable organi-
zation the requirement that "... . no substantial part of the activities of...
[the organization be] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation .... ,,26 Unfortunately, there is no legislative history to
indicate why this explanation of the permissible scope of activities by an
exempt organization was added.2 7 But it would be reasonable to view the
amendment as a codification of the Slee dictum and a rejection of the strict
Treasury point of view. 28 As the Treasury's continued enforcement of its
23. Political agitation as such is outside the statute however innocent the aim....
Controversies of that sort must be conducted without public subvention: The
Treasury stands aside from them.
Id. at 185.
24. Ibid.
25. See, e.g., International Reform Fed. v. District Unemployment Compensation
Bd., 131 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108
(3d Cir. 1941); Lord's Day Alliance v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
and Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1938).
26. 48 Stat. 690 (1934).
27. Nor is the statutory history of this amendment helpful in deciding the appropriate
interpretation to be given it. Uncertainty over the desired scope of the amendment, fear
of abuses and mistakes in administration, and dissatisfaction with the language of the
amendment were present in the short Senate debate. 78 CONG. REc. 5861, 5959 (1934).
28. A high Treasury official once expressed this view:
The 1934 amendment to the law . . . indicated an awareness by the Congress of
the tenor of the court decisions ... and by indirection, a reluctance to hold the line
on the basis of the narrow interpretation by the Service of the 101(6) educational
exemption.
Congress saw fit only to circumscribe the exemption with a restriction against
substantial activities to influence legislation.
Testimony of Norman Sugarman, Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Hearings
19641
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position has shown, the amendment would otherwise have no practical effect
- either in tightening or loosening requirements for exempt status. The
amendment varies from Slee only in replacing Slee's "mediate" and "ancillary"
test by a more manageable focus upon specific activities and the degree to
which the organization engages in them. There is an implicit recognition that
political activities and charitable purposes do overlap: to give tax benefits
to deserving organizations, some political activity (less than a substantial
amount) must be countenanced.
Faced with the Treasury's continued reliance on its pre-1934 position, a
number of courts recently have read the 1934 amendment in the suggested
restrictive manner - as requiring a focus on the activities of a tax-exempt
organization rather than its purposes.2 9 In Dulles v. Johnson," for example,
the IRS argued for the denial of favorable tax treatment of contributions to
various bar associations on the ground that the donees were blighted with
political purposes. The Second Circuit refrained from attempting to classify
the purposes of the organization as "political": it satisfied itself that the pur-
poses were at least charitable and that no substantial part of the donees' ac-
tivity was "propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."131
Other courts, also concentrating on the specific activities of the organization,
have reversed the IRS to accord deductible status to contributions to the
Louisville League of Women Voters,3 2 the Hamilton County Good Govern-
ment League, 3 and the Kentucky Welfare Association3 4 on the ground
that a less than substantial portion of these organizations' activities was de-
voted to influencing legislation. All of these decisions have one common factor:
they look to the behavior of an organization, rather than its aims, once it
becomes clear that the organization, in general terms, is within the class
whose purposes might -be characterized as charitable. And in doing so they
provide the possibility for evolving standards susceptible of quantification and
even-handed administration and review. 5
Before the Special House Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Com-
parable Organizations, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. p. 433 (1954).
29. Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959); Seasongood v. Commissioner,
227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955); International Reform Fed. v. District Unemployment
Compensation Bd., 131 F2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Liberty Nat'l. Bank v. United States,
122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ky. 1954); Davis v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1091 (1952); and
Smith v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 696 (1944).
30. 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959).
31. Id. at 365-68.
The Second Circuit found that activities such as regulation of the unauthorized prac-
tice of law, disciplining of members of the legal profession, endorsing candidates for
judicial office, and even reporting to the legislature on proposed and existing legislation
were beneficial to the public and donations to support them could be construed as charitable.
32. Liberty Nat'l Bank v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D.Ky. 1954).
33. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
34. Davis v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1091 (1952).
35. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1955) and International
Reform Fed. v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 131 F2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
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Why has the Treasury persisted in its emphasis upon "purpose" in the
face of statutory change and judicial disagreement? One explanation is the
Treasury's vigilance against any narrowing of the tax base by expansion of
exemptions and deductions. When presented with alternative reasonable
interpretations, it will often choose the reading most beneficial to the fisc.
But, supposing the present IRS position to be reasonable, the amount of
revenue likely to be obtained from denying or withdrawing preferred status
in the area of charitable deductions seems insignificant.36 Tax revenue will
not be obtained from the charitable organization itself upon withdrawal of
its exemption, for it is unlikely that such organizations have any "income"
for purposes of federal taxation.3 7 Furthermore, so long as organizations which
engage in political activities and the dissemination of their beliefs operate on
a non-profit basis and provide no benefit to private individuals, the Code
permits their classification as civic action or social welfare organizations or
as business leagues.38 As such they are exempt from taxation but individual
contributions to them are non-deductible. Any real revenue significance flow-
ing from withdrawal of preferred status, then, derives from denying the de-
duction of individual contributions to charitable organizations. But additional
revenue will accrue only if people continue donating to the no-longer-exempt
organization or use the monies they would have contributed for non-deductible
purposes. Both hypotheses seem unrealistic. Since the IRS's investigation of
already exempt organizations is only sporadic, many charitable organizations
engaging in marginally "political" activities still enjoy preferred status.39
suggest that the only referent for the 1934 amendment should be lobbying as it is restricted
by legislation. Seasongood suggested the use of United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612
(1954) as a possible source for a definition of lobbying. 227 F.2d at 911-12.
36. See note 18 supra.
37. There do not appear to be any rulings or cases which hold that an organization,
such as FOR, constituted to be non-profit and providing no benefit to any individual, has
"income" for purposes of § 61. Contributions from individuals may be excluded from
income as gifts under § 102.
The status of earnings from property held by such an organization is unclear as is
the allowable deductions against such revenue. The Fellowship has, at the moment,
no specific exemption from taxation, simply maintaining, "it has no income in any taxable
year." Letter From Representative of the Fellowship of Reconciliation to the Yale
Law Journal, Oct. 28, 1963.
38. "Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively
for the promotion of social welfare" under § 501(c) (4) and "Business leagues . . . not
organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual" under § 501(c) (6) are exempt from taxation and
are not restricted in their political activities beyond those deemed incompatible with the
organization's purposes. See Rev. Rul. 177, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 117, in which a § 501
(c) (6) business league is allowed to engage solely in attempts to influence legislation.
39. The Fellowship of Reconciliation, in its Memorandum of January, 1960, and
its Brief of September, 1961 to the Internal Revenue Service, Exempt Organizations
Branch, mentioned a number of organizations, presently exempt, which could be said
to engage in marginal political activities. For example:
Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith
Christian Anti-Communism Crusade
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Consequently, a potential contributor, who finds his previous favorite stripped
of its exempt status, can probably locate a tax-exempt organization engaged in
similar activities. 40 Many contributors, moreover, are motivated more by
the joy of giving (with the concomitant tax advantages) than by desire to
accomplish specific goals. Such donors' contributions are even more fungible,
for the elimination of one object of bounty is not apt to reduce the total of
charitable gifts. Hence, it would appear that the Treasury's restriction of
the political activities of preferred organizations cannot be vindicated as a
protection of the revenue function.
Some justification for the Treasury's position may rest on another ground:
the policy against subvention, government underwriting of political activities.
This policy was articulated and relied upon by Judge Hand in Slee,41 and
imputed to Congress in the early Treasury Regulations which first established
the IRS's present position.42 Congress was said to have recognized that
[government ought] not to benefit and assist the aims of one class against
another, not to encourage the dissemination of ideas in support of one
doctrine as opposed to another .... 43
If political beliefs could be said to vary by income groups, a progressive tax
establishment would require total non-deduction of contributions to politically-
oriented groups. The advantages of deductions to charitable organizations
vary directly with the bracket of the taxpayer who itemizes his contributions.
For those taxpayers who do not itemize their contributions, the allowance
of a deduction would have no effect on the after-tax cost of their contributions."
Thus, the cost of political participation would differ from individual to in-
dividual, with the wealthiest individuals (by and large) having the lowest
cost of participation. The Treasury's broad political purpose test can be viewed
as a response to this problem of subvention. Non-exemption of any organiza-
Christian Freedom Foundation, Inc.
General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church
Zionist Organization
The House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities in a 1950 report concluded that
the American Enterprise Association, the Public Affairs Institute and the Foundation
for Economic Education, Inc., characterized as research organizations, should be subject
to the provisions of the Federal Lobbying Act. H.R. REP. No. 3233, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
19 (1950). These organizations still enjoy tax-exempt status. Cumulative List. U.S.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ORGANizATiows DESCRIBED IN SECTION 170(c) OF THE INTERNAL
REvENUE CODE OF 1954 (1962).
40. The potential contributor to FOR, who still wishes to make deductible contribu-
tions to organizations engaged in similar activities, might give to one of the many pacifist
fellowships affiliated with specific church organizations or to the American Friends
Service Committee, an organization which often sponsors pacifist activities.
41. See note 23 supra.
42. See note 21 supra.
43. S. 1362, 2 Cum. BuLL. 152, 154 (1920).
44. In 1960, only 24,083,000, or 39.5 per cent of the total 61,028,000 returns filed with
the IRS, had itemized deductions. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INCOME, STATISTICS OF IN cOME
... 1960 2 (Preliminary) (1962).
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tion which might arguably be engaged in political activities, prevents the use
of such organizations "at government expense" as conduits for individual
efforts in the political sphere. 45
In the abstract, this plea for neutrality seems meritorious. Even if it were
applied across the board to individuals and businesses, however, the abstract
goal could not presently be achieved. Irrespective of the danger of abuses
of discretion leading to favoritism of some "political purposes" over others,
the sporadic nature of IRS enforcement insures that subvention will remain
for those organizations whose activities the IRS does not happen to review.46
In fact, the policy is no longer applied across the board; tax neutrality, in the
abstract, is no longer a universal concept. By revision of Code Section 162(e)
by the Revenue Act of 1962, Congress explicitly chose to allow some sub-
vention for businesses, which may now deduct certain expenses incurred in
legislative activities.47 The question of the deductibility of these expenses had
been raised, just previous to enactment, in the case of Cammarano v. United
45. Professor Sacks has framed the problem and a possible solution in the following
manner:
For me, the difficulty lies not in the nature of philanthropy but in the possible
distortion of the legislative process. . . If I imagined a universe of foundations,
all of roughly the same financial size and power, then I would embrace all the
gains to our society and to our democratic processes that would come from freeing
foundations to participate legislatively. But, if I envisage as I do, great disparities
of financial resources, then I have to recognize that change in the law may be
a result of these resources, rather than of the free play of ideas .... If one can hope
for change in the tax law . . . I suggest that it would be desirable to permit a
tax deduction, limited not only in percentage but in amount, for contributions to
organizations that desire to engage in legislative activity.
Sacks, Use and Misuse of the Private Foundation, 5th N.Y.U. CONF. oN CHIAATL
FouNDATIONs 203, 208-09.
Such an approach would require the realignment of charitable organizations within
a new scheme of classification in which one group would be allowed deductible contribu-
tions but could not engage in political activities, whereas, the other group would only
be allowed deductible contributions to a small maximum amount and could engage in
political activities. Such a scheme would create, it would seem, many more administrative
problems in the classification of organizations for the determination of the allowable
deduction than is presently the case.
46. See note 39 supra.
47. Section 3 of the Revenue Act of 1962. 76 Stat. 973 (1962). Section 3 created a
new § 162(e) of the INT. RE.v. CODE OF 1954, providing that the following expenses are
ordinary and necessary and may be deducted under § 162(a) :
(A) in direct connection with appearances before, submission of statements to,
or sending communications to, the committees, or individual members, of Congress
or of any legislative body of a State . . with respect to legislation or proposed
legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer, or
(B) in direct connection with communication of information between the tax-
payer and an organization of which he is a member with respect to legislation
* of direct interest. ...
See Weaver, Taxes and Lobbying - The Issue Resolved, 31 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 938
(1963).
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States;48 the Supreme Court disallowed the deduction of expenses incurred
by a liquor dealer in fighting legislation inimical to his business interests. 49
Arguing against deductibility, the IRS had recognized and strongly urged
that tax neutrality, if it were to be meaningful, had to apply to the whole
panoply of participants, including businesses.50 The Supreme Court upheld
the Service, reaffirming the "sharply defined policy" of Slee against govern-
ment subvention and extended this policy to businesses as well as to charitable
organizations.r' The Revenue Act of 1962, by reversing the Supreme Court,
not only makes defense of the policy more difficult, but also indicates a
changed congressional position on subvention versus encouragement of po-
litical participation.5 2 As against any general policy against subvention, the
Senate Finance Committee voiced the apparent resolution of Congress, in
finding it more desirable
48. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
49. In Cammarano, petitioners were engaged in the distribution of beer in the State
of Washington and their contribution was to finance a campaign to defeat a statewide
"initiative" referendum which would have placed the retail sale of wine and beer ex-
clusively in the hand of the state. 358 U.S. at 500.
In F. Strauss & Son v. Commissioner, a companion case, petitioner was engaged in
the wholesale liquor business in Arkansas. Money was contributed to an organization
attempting to defeat an initiative calling for an election of statewide prohibition. 358
U.S. at 502.
50. In the government's brief, the following argument was made:
At the present time . . . any campaigns financed by industry to influence legisla-
tion cannot be charged to the government by taking these expenses as a deduction.
The financing is thus entirely out of the pocket of the concerns involved. This
is equally true as to any citizens' organizations which might be formed to conduct
similar campaigns since contributions to these campaigns would not qualify as
charitable contributions and accordingly are not deductible. The same is true
of a labor organization. Thus a tax equilibrium exists. If the expenses of the
business community were to become deductible, this tax equilibrium would be
upset. While the business community could deduct their expenses, all others could
not, even with respect to the same legislation.
Brief for Respondents, p. 12, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
This argument was implicitly accepted in the Cammarano decision. On "tax equi-
librium" generally, see Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions
for Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. Ray. 365 (1959); Hearings Before the Senate
Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying and Campaign Contribu-
tions, 590-93, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) and 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
51. 358 U.S. at 512.
52. In Section 29 of the Revenue Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1068 (1962) Congress also
evidenced a policy counter to Slee's policy of no subvention. In this section, it was pro-
vided that for purposes of § 170(c) (2) a contribution made during the calendar year 1962
to or for the use of any non-profit organization created and operated exclusively:
(1) to consider proposals for the reorganization of the judicial branch of the
government . . . and
(2) to provide information, make recommendations and seek public support or
opposition as to such proposals




that taxpayers who have information bearing on the impact of present
laws, or proposed legislation .. are not discouraged in making this in-
formation available to Members of Congress or legislators at other levels
of Government.53
Enforcement difficulties, definitional problems, reversals by courts, and
the dangers of untoward discretion may convince that the present Treasury
position, as exhibited in FOR, should be abandoned. In developing an ap-
proach which will tolerate the inevitable political activity of charitable organi-
zations while minimizing discretion, it seems possible to find directions in the
Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1962. Both suggest that activity directed specifically
to achieving legislation is the focus of concern over disallowance. Under the
Code, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1934, a charitable organization re-
tains exempt status if not engaged to a substantial degree in carrying on
"propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation." Section 162 (e)
o f the Code, enacted in the Revenue Act of 1962, presents a different solution
for the same activities. Deductions are permitted for lobbying expenses if
the legislation is "directly" related to the business claiming the deduction, 4
but are not permitted "in connection with any attempt to influence the general
public, or segments thereof, with respect to legislative matters, elections, or
referendums."' ' 5 Under both amendments, it should be noted, there must be
a nexus with legislative matters before the language purports to apply; in
the presence of such a nexus, there is some indication that even under the
1934 amendment, "grass roots" campaigns involving the general public might
be wholly forbidden.5 6 But it may be fairly assumed that in the absence of a
53. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
54. See note 47 supra.
55. Section 162(e) (2) (B).
In addition, there is no deduction for monies expended "for participation in, or inter-
vention in, any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office... ." Sec-
tion 162(e) (2) (A).
56. Certain cases have suggested that the 1934 amendment only restricts the amount
of lobbying in which an organization engages. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d
907, 911-12 (6th Cir. 1955), and International Reform Fed. v. District Unemployment
Compensation Bd., 131 F. 2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1942). If this view were adopted and if it
were thought that the 1934 amendment was the only source of restriction upon an
organization's political activities, an anomalous situation would arise. Organizations
would be restricted to an insubstantial amount of lobbying to achieve legislative aims,
but would be free to achieve these aims by non-lobbying activities - such as sponsorship
of large public rallies and radio programs. To avoid this anomaly, the Congressional
policy embodied in § 162(e) (2) (B) might be imputed to the Code provisions dealing
with charities as a type of in par materia. This policy which, as applied to businesses,
denies the deduction of attempts to influence the general public with respect to legislative
matters might be said to require disqualification for a charitable organization which
engaged in any such activities.
If, however, the very narrow reading of the 1934 amendment is incorrect, then the
language of the amendment might be read to include both lobbying and "grass roots"
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specific nexus - say, where an organization seeks to educate the public in
the desirability of "better government" or "peace" - Congress was not con-
cerned with the dangers of subvention and, hence, disqualification ought not
occur. Certainly insistence upon showing of such a nexus would bring both
the caseload and the discretion of the IRS within more reasonable limits. By
adopting the consistent suggestion that it focus on activity rather than purpose.
and by exercising its concern only for activity mediate to the legislative pro-
cess as the statutes suggest, the IRS could avoid many of the dangers and
failings of its present task.5 7
It is certainly true that such an approach would not be without its diffi-
culties. Difficult problems of definition and fact-characterization remain. It
may often be difficult to distinguish between "grass roots" activity directed
towards specific legislation and general education campaigns without a legis-
lative nexus.58 But the improvement in the structure of dealing with these
problems may be apparent from a reconsideration of FOR in its light. Ini-
tially, the Service would have satisfied itself that FOR's purposes could be
classed as religious or charitable, and refrained from asking if they could
also be classed as "political." As for the existence of political activities, the
IRS would have made two inquiries: whether a substantial amount of the
activities of FOR were lobbying or other forms of representation before
legislatures; whether FOR is at present engaged in attempts to mold public
legislative activity and that only a less than substantial amount of both types of activity
is permitted for exempt organizations.
With either interpretation, success will depend upon the evolution of a list of items
which can be characterized as "lobbying" or "grass roots" activity related to legislation.
Such specificity will be the only means of minimizing the discretionary power of the IRS.
57. The case of Seasonwood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955) holds
out hope for a quantitative standard upon which decisions as to the existence of imper-
missible political activities may be made. In this case, it was observed that
less than 5% of the time and effort of the League was devoted to the activities
that the Tax Court found to be "political." . . . we conclude that the so-called
"political activities" of the League were not in relation to all of its other ac-
tivities substantial, within the meaning of the section.
227 F.2d at 912.
The use of such a quantitative standard can greatly facilitate the review process
and place it on a regularized basis. § 6033(b) requires exempt organizations to file an
annual return furnishing information on, among other things, gross income and dis-
bursements out of income. Form 990-A, which is now employed for this annual report,
could be modified so as to require information about expenditures for lobbying and
"grass roots" campaigning for specific legislation. This would provide the IRS with
information which could systematically be examined for excessive or suspicious expendi-
tures and other types of irregularities.
58. Such difficulties are already present in § 501(c) (3) which prevents an organiza-
tion from participating in, or intervening in "any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office." In both cases, rules are needed to establish what kind of
relationship is necessary - between an organization's activity and a candidate for election
or a bill pending before a legislature - before such activity will unclass the exempt
organization.
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opinion in favor of certain specific legislative changes. From the available
evidence, it would seem that the answer to both questions should be "no";
FOR does not appear to have a legislative program, nor is there any "peace"
bill before Congress. 9 As FOR's activities are not being directed to presently
debated legislative proposals, a requirement of a specific nexus with legislative
action would find them unexceptionable. By reducing the radius of disquali-
fying activity and by denoting for disqualification activities readily identified,
such a requirement would bring the IRS's task closer to the limitations of
its revenue and personnel, and so avoid many of the dangers and inconsisten-
cies presently attending administration of the charitable deduction provisions.
59. See note 15 mipra.
